WIKILEAKS: ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΟ ΕΝΑΝΤΙ ΕΝΤΑΞΗΣ ΠΡΟΩΘΟΥΣΑΝ ΟΙ ΗΠΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ

Εμπιστευτικό έγγραφο των ΗΠΑ για την Κύπρο και την Τουρκία

Ήθελαν να βοηθήσουν την ευρωπαϊκή πορεία της Τουρκίας μέσω Κύπρου

Θεωρούσαν τον Ερντογάν, ως τον «άνθρωπο-κλειδί» για να πάρει τις σωστές αποφάσεις στο Κυπριακό.

Ήθελαν λύση το συντομότερο μέσω Ντεκτάς.

Ως αντάλλαγμα οι ΗΠΑ, θα επαναλάμβαναν τη στήριξη τους στην ευρωπαϊκή υποψηφιότητα της Τουρκίας

Τρόπους να επηρεάσουν την πορεία της Τουρκίας στην Ε.Ε μέσω Κυπριακού, πρότειναν το 2002 οι ΗΠΑ.

Ο τότε Αμερικανός πρεσβευτής W.R. Pearson, χαρακτήριζε σε εμπιστευτικό έγγραφο ως «άτεγκτη», την πολιτική της Τουρκίας στο Κυπριακό και θεωρούσε τον Ταγίπ Ερντογάν, ως τον «άνθρωπο –κλειδί», για να πάρει τις σωστές αποφάσεις στο Κυπριακό, για το Ιράκ, την εσωτερική πολιτική αλλά και την οικονομική μεταρρύθμιση της χώρας.

Κατά την διάρκεια του 2002, ο Ταγίπ Ερντογάν, ο οποίος ήταν δήμαρχος της Κωνσταντινούπολης, θεωρείτο ως ο ισχυρότερος πολιτικός της Τουρκίας. Αντιμετώπιζε όμως την έντονη αντίθεση από το βαθύ κράτος, το οποίο όπως αναφέρεται στο εμπιστευτικό έγγραφο, θα χρησιμοποιούσε όλη τη δύναμη που διέθετε, είτε μέσω νομικών διαδικασιών είτε μέσω προβοκατόρικων ενεργειών για να κρατήσει τον Ερντογάν σε ανισορροπία.

Το βαθύ κράτος, αναφερόταν στο έγγραφο, απαρτίζεται από μια ομάδα Τούρκων πολιτικών και στρατιωτικών, οι οποίοι αντιτίθενται σε κάθε δημοκρατική μεταρρύθμιση στο πολιτικό σύστημα. Η πολιτική τους ατζέντα, περιλαμβάνει μεταξύ άλλων την προώθηση του εθνικισμού και των συμφερόντων της Τουρκίας.

«Να πιεστεί ο Ντεκτάς για λύση το συντομότερο»

Όσον αφορά το κυπριακό, όπως αναφέρεται στο έγγραφο, οι ΗΠΑ, θα υποβοηθούσαν τον Ερντογάν, ούτως ώστε μέσω του Ντεκτάς, να επιτευχθεί λύση το συντομότερο.

Ως αντάλλαγμα, οι ΗΠΑ θα επαναλάμβαναν την στήριξη τους στην υποψηφιότητα της Τουρκίας για ένταξη στην Ε.Ε και θα έδινε στον Ερντογάν τις τελευταίες πληροφορίες των ΗΠΑ για το σημείο στο οποίο βρίσκονταν οι διαπραγματεύσεις, όπως παραδοσιακά έκαναν στην Άγκυρα, οι ΗΠΑ.
Σε ένα προσωπικό σημείωμα, ο συντάκτης, τονίζει ακόμα ότι ο Ερντογάν έχει ισχυρή άποψη για την προσωπική του εικόνα, με έντονη υπερηφάνεια. Αυτά τα δύο χαρακτηριστικά αναφέρει το σημείωμα, πλήττονται εύκολα όταν θεωρεί ότι δεν τυγχάνει αρκετού σεβασμού ενώ αντιδρά έντονα στην κριτική.

«Το χαρακτηριστικό του Ερντογάν», σχολιάζει ο συντάκτης του σημειώματος, «είναι ότι κάνει τις δηλώσεις του μετριοπαθώς και λακωνικά. Αν συναντήσει αντίδραση, γίνεται ιδιαίτερα άτεγκτος και αλλάζει θέμα». Το σημείωμα, ετοιμάστηκε για την επίσκεψη του Ερντογάν στην Ουάσινγκτον το 2002.

Το περιεχόμενο του εγγράφου όπως διέρρευσε μέσω Wikileaks:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 008852

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2012

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINS TU

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEC. 9-10 WASHINGTON VISIT OF AK PARTY CHAIRMAN R. TAYYIP ERDOGAN



REF: A. ANKARA 6856

B. ANKARA 8252

C. ANKARA 7683

D. ANKARA 8448

E. ANKARA 8382


(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: As Turkey's strongest politician Tayyip

Erdogan is key to our ability to influence the AK Party

government and public opinion on Iraq and other strategic

U.S. interests. His heightened sense of pride is

undiminished, indeed boosted, by the Kemalist State's

continuing attempts to spike his return to full public life;

treating him as if he were already head of government will

thus pay enormous dividends for U.S. influence in Turkey and

underscore to the EU our strong support for a date for

Turkish accession talks from the Copenhagen summit. End

summary.


2. (C) Coming off a smashing electoral victory by his AK

(Justice and Development) Party and a tour of 14 EU capitals

where he was welcomed like a head of government, unelected

Tayyip Erdogan is the new colossus in Turkish politics. What

gave Erdogan's party its victory on Nov. 3 were his

reputation as a responsive mayor of Istanbul, his advocacy of

fair and just reforms, and his political magnetism across

Anatolia, a magnetism enhanced by the State's controversial

decision to rule him ineligible to stand for election (ref

A). Erdogan is now determined to parlay his victory and new

national stature into a restoration of his political rights

so he may enter Parliament and assume the prime ministership

by late winter or early spring.
3. (C) Despite his popularity in urban sprawls and across

Anatolia, Erdogan is far from being universally liked.

Indeed, he is loathed by most of the Establishment. The

Establishment prefers to portray him as a mediocrely

educated, local tough guy made (too) good, a charismatic but

dangerous preacher-politician who will lead Turkey to the

Sharia. Many political and bureaucratic insiders tell us

that, for this reason, the Deep State (ref B) will do all in

its power through legal maneuver or provocations to try to

keep Erdogan permanently off balance.


4. (C) In this context Erdogan's visit to Washington is an

excellent opportunity to promote core U.S. interests by (1)

demonstrating that we respect the democratic election results

in Turkey and the AK government's commitment to further

democratization; (2) strengthening our influence with AK and

Erdogan as the paramount politician in Turkey today; and (3)

convincing Erdogan, the one politician who can deliver Turkey

at this stage, to make the right decisions on Iraq, Cyprus,

and domestic political and economic reform.

Erdogan The Man
5. (C) Erdogan's charisma, defensiveness, strong intuition,

commanding (even authoritarian) presence, common touch --

rare among Turkish politicians -- and slight swagger come

from having to make his way as a youth in the gritty Istanbul

neighborhood of Kasimpasa, attending a preacher (imam-hatip)

high school, and playing professional soccer. He is both

prone to emotional reactions and cool in wielding political

power. He has a huge self-image and heightened sense of

pride, both easily wounded when he thinks he is not being

shown due respect, and reacts badly to criticism. Yet he has

proved he has a strong pragmatic streak as mayor of the 12

million-strong Istanbul, in trying to break out of sclerotic

approaches to Cyprus, and in having a well-tuned (if

acquired) sense of timing on when to push and when to hold

back on sensitive questions like the headscarf issue.


6. (C) Not knowing any foreign language and lacking a strong,

well-rounded education, Erdogan relies on his intuitions,

presence, and ability to bond to manage meetings with foreign

interlocutors. He will listen intently and expects his

interlocutors to treat him and the subject seriously, even

earnestly. At the same time, he is open to the well-timed

joke or lighter comment. In the latter regard, Erdogan is a

passionate fan of Fenerbahce, nicknamed the Yellow Canary,

one of the big three Istanbul (and Turkish) soccer clubs; a

gift with a yellow or yellow and blue motif would be a hit,

especially if accompanied by a comment relating to his

passion for soccer. Erdogan's style is to make his points

initially softly and laconically; if he meets resistance he

ratchets up his second response, becoming more stern with

each exchange on the topic. He reacts badly to overt

pressure or implied threats. The best way to convince him to

take a tough decision is to appeal calmly but man-to-man to

his sense of destiny as Turkey's leader.

Erdogan's Party

7. (C) Ref (C) lays out AK's strengths and challenges as they

may affect U.S. interests. In the latter regard, we are

seeing a post-election differentiation, and thus more of an

opening for intra-party tension, in two areas. First,

between the party's parliamentary group (which just elected a

more religiously conservative set of whips than P.M. Gul

expected) and party leadership (which is more weighted to the

pragmatic group around Erdogan and Gul). Second, between

fiery parliamentary Speaker Arinc and the calmer Gul (ref D).

Erdogan will have his hands full keeping the party together

as the strains of governing and legislating and outside

pressures from the Establishment, public opinion, and foreign

policy demands play on the fractions and fissures already

extant in this conglomerate party. Many of our contacts from

left to center-right predict that AK will split within a

year. Perhaps this assessment is wishful thinking tinged

with envy, but AK indeed faces marked internal stresses going

forward.


Erdogan's Government

8. (C) Erdogan is not yet in the government, but by

dominating the news he has ensured that everyone here and

abroad recognizes him as de facto -- and future de jure --

head of government. Gul's cabinet (ref E), formed under

Erdogan's guidance, mixes men with experience dealing with

the Deep State or bureaucracy -- Defense (DefMin Gonul is

respected by President Sezer, who is otherwise wary of the

new government), Interior, MFA, Education -- with insiders

from Erdogan's Istanbul municipal administration and some

with wheeler-dealer business connections.

9. (C) Gul will rapidly shepherd through Parliament

EU-related democratic reforms and the constitutional changes

designed to open the door for Erdogan's assumption of the

prime ministership, perhaps in mid- to late winter. A large

question remains whether AK has a skillful enough pool of

talent to staff the Undersecretary levels and below. We thus

share Turkish observers' questions about how well AK will be

able (a) to respond pragmatically on foreign policy; (b) to

maintain credible economic reform and banking supervisory

standards; and (c) to carry out its intended strong reform

and anti-corruption drives when faced with deeply entrenched

interests and practices.

How to Influence Erdogan

10. (C) Given Erdogan's wariness toward the Turkish

bureaucracy, it will be key to draw Erdogan aside from his

bureaucratic minders to elicit his true thinking on sensitive

topics. At the same time, U.S. interlocutors can enhance the

impact of their message if they have aides cultivate his

closest advisors, especially Erdogan's closest foreign policy

advisor Omer Celik. In the wake of the Dec. 3

Wolfowitz-Grossman visit, we suggest the following approach

to Erdogan on four key questions:
--Iraq: emphasize the benefits to Turkey of full cooperation

in coalition preparations for a possible military operation

and convince Erdogan he can sell maximum cooperation as not

letting foreigners control Turkey's future: "if you don't

play the game you don't make the rules."
--EU and reform: in reiterating the strength of our support

for Turkey's candidacy, give Erdogan our latest information

on EU member states' stance (as we have been doing regularly

in Ankara) to prepare him for his lobbying in Copenhagen,

emphasize the crucial impact of further reform, and urge him

to portray the Summit decision on Turkey positively.


--Cyprus: urge Erdogan to get Denktas to reach a settlement

soonest.
--Economic reform, anti-corruption, anti-torture measures,

and open government: note that Erdogan's party will be

measured at home most by these four yardsticks, note the

centrality of maintaining reform momentum and strong, clean

banking regulation for the government's image and for

preserving market confidence (Erdogan is coming under the

sway of corrupt and failed bank owners).

PEARSON
 
ΠΗΓΗ:  SigmaLive/Μ.Χαραλάμπους
21 Μαρτίου 2011, 14:43 EET